The moral economy: why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens

By:

Bowles, Samuel

Material type:

TextPublication details: New Haven and London Yale University Press 2016Description: xvi, 272p. Includes appendixes, notes, works cited and indexISBN:

9780300230512

Subject(s):

Other classification:

X0aZ Q6

Summary: Should the idea of economic man—the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus—determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding “no.” Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may “crowd out” ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.

Item type:

Textbook

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Holdings
Cover image	Item type	Current library	Home library	Collection	Shelving location	Call number	Materials specified	Vol info	URL	Copy number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode	Item holds	Item hold queue priority	Course reserves
	Textbook	Ratan Tata Library	Ratan Tata Library			X0aZ Q6 (Browse shelf(Opens below))					Available			RT1528384

Should the idea of economic man—the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus—determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding “no.” Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may “crowd out” ethical and generous motives and thus backfire.

But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.

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