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003 OSt
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008 230608s2024 ilu b 001 0 eng
020 _a9780226830049
_q(paperback)
040 _cSDCL
082 _aR1 R4
100 1 _aSuárez, Mauricio
_9809761
245 1 0 _aInference and representation :
_ba study in modeling science
264 1 _aChicago ;
_aLondon :
_bThe University of Chicago Press,
_c2024.
300 _axi, 316p.
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 _aIntroducing scientific representation -- Part I. Modeling. The modeling attitude : a genealogy; Models and their uses -- Part II. Representation. Theories of representation; Against substance; Scientific theories and deflationary representation; Representation as inference -- Part III. Implications. Lessons from the philosophy of art; Scientific epistemology transformed.
520 _a"Mauricio Suárez develops a conception of representation that delivers a compelling account of modeling practice. He begins by discussing the history and methodology of model building, helpfully charting the emergence of what he calls the modeling attitude, a nineteenth century and fin de siècle development. Throughout the book, prominent cases of models, both historical and contemporary, are used as benchmarks for the accounts of representation considered throughout the book. After arguing against reductive naturalist theories of scientific representation, Suárez sets out his own account: a case for pluralism regarding the means of representation and minimalism regarding its constituents. He shows that scientists employ a plurality of different modeling relations in their representational practice - which also help them to assess the accuracy of their representations - while demonstrating that there is nothing metaphysically deep about the constituent relation that encompasses all these diverse means. The book also probes the broad implications of Suárez's inferential conception outside scientific modeling itself, covering analogies with debates about artistic representation over the past several decades, as well as the consequences for epistemology of adopting an inferential conception of representation. His inferential conception is neutral between realism and instrumentalism, and he illustrates this by looking at, and briefly taking issue with, the epistemology of some of the most widely discussed philosophers in the literature"--
_cProvided by publisher.
650 0 _aScience
_xPhilosophy.
_9810802
650 0 _aScience
_xMethodology.
_9810803
650 0 _aRepresentation (Philosophy)
_9810804
650 0 _aInference.
_9733383
650 0 _aKnowledge, Theory of.
_9810805
942 _2CC
_cTEXL
_n0
999 _c1429845
_d1429845