000			02058cam a2200241 i 4500
005			20250624094840.0
008			221128s2023 gw b 001 0 eng
020			_a9783110772838
040			_aCSL _cCSL
041			_2eng _aeng
084			_aD65,8(B):(X62) R3 _qCSL
100	1		_aWarren, Micah _eauthor. _9814343
245	1	0	_aBitcoin _b: A game-theoretic analysis
260			_aBoston : _bDe Gruyter, _c2023.
300			_axv, 328 p. _b: ill. _c; 25 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520			_aThe definitive guide to the game-theoretic and probabilistic underpinning for Bitcoin's security model. The book begins with an overview of probability and game theory. Nakamoto Consensus is discussed in both practical and theoretical terms. This volume: Describes attacks and exploits with mathematical justifications, including selfish mining. Identifies common assumptions such as the Market Fragility Hypothesis, establishing a framework for analyzing incentives to attack. Outlines the block reward schedule and economics of ASIC mining. Discusses how adoption by institutions would fundamentally change the security model. Analyzes incentives for double-spend and sabotage attacks via stock-flow models. Overviews coalitional game theory with applications to majority takeover attacks. Presents Nash bargaining with application to unregulated environments. This book is intended for students or researchers wanting to engage in a serious conversation about the future viability of Bitcoin as a decentralized, censorship-resistant, peer-to-peer electronic cash system. Explains the game theoretic underpinning of Bitcoin from inception to large-scale adoption. Combines basics of game theory, probability and the Proof-of-Work protocol. Includes end of chapter exercises, and python code snippets. --
650		0	_aBitcoin. _9814344
650		0	_aGame theory. _9235651
650		0	_aStrategic planning. _9579989
650		0	_aEconomics.
942			_2CC _cTEXL _hD65,8(B):(X62) R3 _n0
999			_c1432842 _d1432842