000			01001nam a2200181 4500
005			20260409144201.0
008			260406b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9780691171739
037			_cTextual
040			_aRTL _cRTL
084			_qRTL _aX815 Q7
100			_aChiappori, Pierre-Andre _91234092
245			_aMatching with transfers: The economics of loves and marriage
260			_aNew Jersey _bPrinceton University Press _c2017
300			_axvi, 241 p. _bIncludes bibliographical reference and index
520			_aOver the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets to organ donations, but recent work has tended to focus on “nontransferable” cases rather than matching models with transfers.
942			_2CC _n0 _cTEXL _hX815 Q7
999			_c1847970 _d1847970